

1 201839nat i c 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION for the ADVANCEMENT of COLORED PEOPLE, 4 SPRING VALLEY BRANCH, et al., 5 Plaintiffs, 6 17 Civ. 8943 (CS) v. 7 8 EAST RAMAPO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 13 United States Courthouse 14 White Plains, N.Y. March 9, 2018 15 10:30 a.m. 16 17 18 19 Before: THE HONORABLE CATHY SEIBEL, 20 District Judge 21 22

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1	APPEARANCES
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3	NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
4	For Plaintiffs PERRY GROSSMAN
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6	LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs SERRIN ANDREW TURNER COREY ANNE CALABRESE ELIZABETH ANNA PARVIS JENNIFER J. MATYSTIK
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11	MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP Attorneys for Defendant East Ramapo Central School RANDALL M. LEVINE DAVID J. BUTLER
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14	ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General for the State of New York ELYCE MATTHEWS Assistant Attorney General for the State of New York
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THE DEPUTY CLERK: In the matter of National	
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Spring	
Valley Branch against The East Ramapo Central School District,	
et al.	
Will counsel please note their appearance for the	
record.	
MS. CALABRESE: Corey Calabrese from Latham & Watkins	
for the plaintiffs.	
MR. TURNER: Good morning, your Honor. Serrin Turner	
from Latham & Watkins for the plaintiffs.	
MR. GROSSMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Perry	
Grossman from the New York Civil Liberties Union for the	
plaintiffs.	
MS. MATYSTIK: Good morning, your Honor. Jennifer	
Matystik for the plaintiffs.	
MS. PARVIS: And Elizabeth Parvis of Latham & Watkins	
for the plaintiffs.	
THE COURT: Good morning to you all. Have a seat.	
MR. BUTLER: Good morning, your Honor. David Butler,	
Morgan Lewis, for the defendant District.	
MR. LEVINE: Good morning, your Honor. Randall	
Levine from Morgan Lewis for the defendant District.	
MS. MATTHEWS: Elyce Matthews from the Attorney	
General's Office for Commissioner Elia. Good morning, your	
Honor.	

THE COURT: Good morning to all of you. Have a seat.

I've got letters. I've got Mr. Butler's letter of

March 1st, and I guess Ms. Salomon wrote to me on March 7th for
plaintiffs.

The application was to, I guess, not make a motion in limine, but let me know about an intended motion in limine, and the plaintiffs raise the issue that that is not the proper mechanism for deciding the issue that the defendants want me to decide. And I suppose, technically, that's correct, but this is clearly an issue that needs to be tee'd up for purposes of discovery, and, while, technically, this may not have been the way to go about it, I think it makes sense for me to deal with it, because if it were to come up through discovery disputes and Judge McCarthy made the decision, one or the other of you would appeal it to me anyway.

So I'm happy to sort of address the overarching issue without having a specific motion in limine in front of me because plaintiffs are right that a motion in limine has to be directed toward something in particular, but the overall issue here, as I see it, is one of relevance.

And if I understand the state of play correctly, the plaintiffs are arguing that the evidence they've been seeking essentially relating to how the Board has been running the district goes to the responsiveness factor in Gingles, or in the Senate Report that's quoted in Gingles.

Seems to me, here, the responsiveness issue is actually a lot easier than it sometimes is in these cases because you've got a situation where 90 -- I forget exactly the numbers, but something like 99 percent of the private school students are white and a similar percentage, maybe it's 95 or 96 percent, of the public school students are black and Hispanic, and so it's not much of a leap to say that that if the School Board is not responsive to the needs of the kids in the school, that the School Board is not responsive to black and Hispanic voters.

So why, Mr. Butler, wouldn't it be relevant for the plaintiff to show that the Board is not responsive to the parents of public school kids who want good public schools and, instead, is responsive to other people who want lower taxes or other things that benefit their families and not public school families? Or Mr. Levine.

MR. LEVINE: Well, I mean, I think it's very important to just understand what the Senate factor is referring to when it talks about responsiveness. And what the Senate factor describes is a particularized inquiry dealing with discrete requests or discrete needs of particular members of a minority group. It is not referring to broad, generalized disputes over public policy where there are legitimate views on both sides of what tax rates should be or what education policies should be. That's not what the Court is asked to

decide because it has no connection with elections or voting or anything that's relevant under the Voting Rights Act.

That's not say to say responsiveness, as a general matter, is never relevant to any case under the Voting Rights Act, but the Senate Report itself says that it's only in some cases when it may have some limited probative value, and that's really --

THE COURT: Why isn't this one of those cases?

MR. LEVINE: Well, because those cases are cases almost always where the plaintiffs are alleging intentional discrimination. And the way they want to prove intentional discrimination is that these same government officials that are not responding to their requests for, you know, garbage pickup in the minority neighborhoods are the ones who are in control of how the elections are run. And so that's where that factor comes into play, and it's where it came into play historically.

The Senate Report itself says this is not an essential factor, it's not probative in most cases. And, here, the plaintiffs don't make any effort to connect it in any way to actual things that are relevant under the Voting Rights Act. It does not show in any way and they haven't articulated any reason why it shows that minorities are not -- are excluded from the political participation in the district on account of race. Their disagreement with --

THE COURT: Well, it shows that the people who got

elected don't care about the opinions of these voters. Isn't that a relevant factor?

If you're on the school board and there's block voting, as the plaintiffs have to show, and the white people are voting to give benefits to private schools and to keep taxes down and to decimate the public schools -- let's say they can prove that -- doesn't that show that the people on the school board don't care about the votes of the minority families and that, therefore, the people who are elected are responsive only to the white voters? Isn't that something that's helpful to their case?

MR. LEVINE: Well, so I think it's useful to break that up a little bit because there's a lot going on in there, for one thing, right?

What you're describing is an inherent consequence of any system of electoral politics, right? Where the people who get elected are going to have policies that they're going to pursues because that's what they were elected to do, and the fact that they don't do the things that the other people who lost the election want them to do, that can't be what responsiveness means because that's a consequence of every single election. It's not like, you know, I get to bring a Voting Rights Act claim because I don't like the things that Donald trump is doing. Right? That's not the way that works, right?

THE COURT: Well, it certainly wouldn't be enough, but is it completely irrelevant that the way the elections work in this municipality is that a large portion of the public, specifically the constituents in the schools, are unrepresented in the schools?

You know, we're not talking about a legislator in Congress here. We're talking about people who are elected to run the schools, which are essentially black and Hispanic schools, and a situation where the votes of black and Hispanic people are irrelevant. Maybe. If they can show it.

And I think some of the cases you quote, or Mr. Butler quoted in his letter, including Martinez, on responsiveness are not really relevant because they're talking about Congress, and Congress is really different in terms of responsiveness. When you're talking about the local level on the street, you know, the responsiveness means something a lot more concrete than just, you know, I think NAFTA is or is not good or bad. It's talking about the services that you're getting on a day-to-day basis.

MR. LEVINE: In some ways, yes; in some ways, no.

You're absolutely right about that. And a school board is
actually an interesting case because it's a hybrid in some
ways, right? But it can't be the case that politicians who are
elected on a platform of maintaining property tax rates can be
accused of not being responsive to minority voters because the

minority voters wanted them to increase taxes instead. Right' What would be the point of elections if that was a Voting Rights Act violation? That's not what responsiveness means.

It is also not what they're trying to show for purposes of responsiveness. When you look at the evidence that they want to put in, there is no rational limitation whatsoever to an effort to show that this particular school board is just not listening and doesn't care about minority voters. They want to put on evidence of everything. They want to try everything that was in the Montesa case. They want to try electives. They want to try transportation funding. They want to try everything. I mean, they want to try special education. There's nothing I can think of that would not come in under their view of what responsiveness is, and that just can't be right. There's no cases out there that have ever done anything like that. Right?

Sometimes you will see an analysis of responsiveness in a case, even a case involving a school board. In fact, the Ferguson case that was recently decided is a pretty good example because, there, the plaintiffs made a few very, very discrete showings of what they characterized as a lack of responsiveness by the school board, things that individual members of the minority group asked for, wanted and won't addressed, but that opened it up for the school board to come back and say, well, you know, there are other times when we did

respond to it, and it ended up making the factor a wash, and it ended up being irrelevant at the end of the day.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what they plan to prove. Right now, they're just asking for discovery.

Obviously, at the PI hearing, we're going to have to have some limitations, but, ultimately, if they want to prove up that the defendants are looting the school budget to the benefit of the white community and to the detriment of the black and the Hispanic community, I don't see why they wouldn't --

MR. LEVINE: There would be no nexus whatsoever with any of the elements of a Voting Rights Act claim. That's not a Voting Rights Act claim.

THE COURT: Well, responsiveness is one of them. And they're saying, oh, if what the plaintiffs allege is true and the school board is saying, gee, we would love to give you electives, we would love to give you music and art, we would love to give you sports, but we just have no money, and it turns out there is money, but it's being syphoned into places where it doesn't belong, that suggests a lack of responsiveness.

MR. LEVINE: But it does not suggest anything about the electoral system that's being challenged.

THE COURT: Well, it suggests that the --

MR. LEVINE: The power of the votes is --

THE COURT: It suggests that the way the system is

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set up, it permits the votes of the families who are in the schools to be essentially irrelevant.

MR. LEVINE: The Court does not need to decide any of those things to conclude one way or another whether or not the Voting Rights Act has been violated. And, in fact, it will not help you decide one way or another whether the Voting Rights Act has been violated, because even if you find exactly what you just described, even if you find that they've been siphoning money out of the school district, as plaintiffs like these have been alleging for years and never been able to prove despite all their efforts, even if you find that, it will not show a Voting Rights Act violation. It simply doesn't move the ball forward because there are specific things that need to be found to show a Voting Rights Act violation. There are elements of a claim that are different from the allegations that were made in the Montesa case. They're completely distinct.

THE COURT: Look, I recognize this case is completely distinct in many respects, which is why maybe it poses a bigger challenge to the defendants than the last time around. But let me ask the plaintiffs.

You know, Mr. Levine says responsiveness doesn't mean that the policies the losing party prefers aren't getting implemented. That always is the case. And in every town, in every school board election, there are people who want lower

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taxes versus the people who want better schools, and whoever wins gets their way. So why is it relevant that, here, like in any other election, the people who lost aren't getting their way?

So, your Honor, I can connect this to MR. GROSSMAN: the Voting Rights Act, and I believe the Gingles case does and other cases in which school boards have litigated do as well. The fact is when you have, as you identified, racial block voting and you have private schools that are white and public schools that are minority, the minority voters have a particularized need for services to the public schools. is not going to exist in every school district. There is not necessarily racial block voting in every single school district. Not every issue is going to be won where there are particularized needs of a minority community, but where, as you identified, you have a clear racial demarcation between two sets of schools, the fact that the school board is making judgments that favor white schools over minority schools is going to show that, whatever the wisdom of the Board's judgments, it is not electorally accountable to those minority voters and can effectively ignore what it is they want.

THE COURT: But how do I know if the reason they're not accountable is because there's just more white voters or the white voters are more organized or the lower tax people are more passionate or because there's some violation going on?

MR. GROSSMAN: So that is to say that, one, the districts, of course, are able to put in evidence of responsiveness in order to rebut evidence of unresponsiveness. But it's part of the totality of the circumstances that exist, right? The primary and weightiest factors in the Voting Rights Act inquiry are the Gingles factors and the existence of racially polarized voting. What the responsiveness inquiry and other parts of the Senate factors show is what are the consequences for minority voters in terms of that racial block voting.

So, here, and in other similar cases, where there are particularized needs of the minority community that the board is not responding to, whether they are individualized inquiries of the kind Mr. Levine suggested might be relevant or broader sort of policy issues where there are, as you suggested, the Board is looting the public schools in order to pay for private schools, it just shows that there is a lack of any sense of —that the at-large system makes these elected officials so secure as to make any appeal to these minority interests unnecessary. If they want to rebut that, they can, but it certainly is relevant to show that minority voters don't have sway here.

And what we've alleged is that, in an at-large system, white block voting can always out-vote minority block voting, and so they have, effectively, nine -- a veto over

every seat on the board. And when you look at the potential consequences of a Voting Rights Act violation and an award system were implemented, then you might see minority preferred legislators elected from those districts who can at least represent the interests of the minority community and add some input in order to make sure that those policy decisions are made in the way that do favor sort of political interests as opposed to simply a lack of responsiveness to the needs of the minority community.

MR. LEVINE: Let's assume for a second that maybe there is some shred of relevance to actual patterns of voting and whether the electoral system that's in place has a discriminatory effect. There have to be some practical considerations made here. And so if we take it out of the 402 world and put it into the 403 world, they are going to put on almost their entire case on a factor that the Senate Report itself says is not essential and has little probative value. Every court that looks at it says it has little probative value. They're going to impose enormous burdens on the Court and on the District and on the State to rebut this evidence.

THE COURT: Where does the Senate Report say it's of little probative value?

MR. LEVINE: The Senate Report says --

THE COURT: I thought it said responsiveness doesn't have much probative value, but unresponsiveness does.

MR. LEVINE: Well, what it says is additional factors in some cases have had probative value, such as whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness. So it's already acknowledging that, only in some cases, but not in all, is it going to have any probative value. And then it says unresponsiveness is not an essential part of plaintiff's case.

THE COURT: True. That means plaintiffs can win without proving it, but it doesn't mean that it doesn't help them win if they do prove it.

MR. LEVINE: Well, right, but it also means that even if they do prove it, even if we stipulate, okay, fine, fine, nonresponsive, fine, you win, they still lose this case.

THE COURT: Maybe so. And maybe you want to stipulate to it because maybe the discovery is so burdensome and the facts so obvious that you want to stipulate to it. I don't know.

But I do think it is fair to say, in the unique situation we have here, where, essentially, the public schools are minority and the private schools are white and that it is fair to say the Board's responsiveness to public school needs is synonomous with its responsiveness to minority needs and it seems like, based on what I know about this community -- and I've never seen evidence; I've only seen allegations -- but it does seem like there are a bunch of things going on that suggest that the members of the Board have no concern about

the -- at least some of them -- about losing the votes of the public school families. I don't think that that's going to drive a decision either way, but I don't think it's irrelevant, either. I mean, the Supreme Court said it's a factor in some cases, and I can't tell you ahead of time whether it is or isn't in this case. I can tell you it sounds like it is. And this is a very -- no pun intended -- black-and-white situation where this case lacks some of the complications you see in other cases because, here, the schools are black and Hispanic -- the public schools are black and Hispanic and the private schools are white and the white people are voting for Board members who are not prioritizing public education. If they can show that.

So it seems -- I'm reaching no conclusions at all about what effect any such evidence might have, but I'm certainly not in a position now to say that I can tell that it's not going to be relevant. So I think it is a proper subject for discovery. The extent to which what plaintiffs are asking for is proportional and reasonable and all that I will leave to Judge McCarthy. I do think that some of the things that plaintiffs have asked for are more targeted than others. For example, things like staffing levels, class sizes, extra curricular, academic offerings, all that seems more relevant to me than things like what contractors are chosen.

MR. LEVINE: I'm sorry, your Honor. Staffing levels

in the public schools are relevant to whether the election system violates the Voting Rights Act?

THE COURT: Yes. Because if the black and Hispanic kids are in classes of 40 because they won't hire enough teachers, that goes to responsiveness.

MR. LEVINE: Well, to use your own words, maybe it's a crummy school district, but what does that have to do with the Voting Rights Act?

THE COURT: But, you know, you quoted a sliver of that argument, at the end of which I concluded it did have to do with the Voting Rights Act.

We are here because you guys wanted all plaintiffs' records of any complaints they made to the school district because it related to responsiveness, and I gave it to you because it relates to responsiveness.

MR. LEVINE: Well, not because it related to responsiveness. Right? I mean, that's actually one of the interesting sort of problems we have here.

THE COURT: You know, you're in this district and you're complaining to the Board my kid's been in school for 14 years now and can't graduate because there's not enough Regents math classes and he has to take four study halls a day because there aren't enough teachers and there aren't enough offerings, and my kid wants to go to college and can't go to college, and whether the Board responds to that sounds to me like it's

relevant to responsiveness. So that's why I required them to give you all that stuff.

MR. LEVINE: So what does respond mean in that context? Are you saying that they do what the person is asking them to do regardless of anything else or what? I mean, if that's the thing, I don't understand.

THE COURT: If they can show a pattern over time of the Board not giving a darn about the concerns of the minority voters, that's one of the factors under the test. I don't know if it's going to have any ultimate effect or not, but it certainly is something the Supreme Court said can be relevant. I see absolutely no basis at this point to say that this is one of the cases where it's not relevant. Like I said, certain things seem more on point than others. Selection of contractors, I'm not sure how that relates to responsiveness at all, unless there's some scheme to overpay contractors or something like that, to loot the schools. I don't know.

I'm going to leave it to Judge McCarthy to decide what is or is not reasonable and proportionate under the discovery rules, but I am saying that the extent to which the School Board responds to the concerns of the public school parents, which is the same as the minority parents, at this stage, is relevant. Whether it ultimately carries the day, I don't know.

And I certainly am not going to tell you how to do

your job, but it may be the kind of thing where it makes sense to stipulate to it. Maybe the Board is of the view that it's their obligation to disregard the wishes of the people who didn't vote for them and they will have no hesitation in saying, yeah, we're not responsive to the people who didn't vote for us, we're responsive to the people who voted for us, and then you take that out of the hearing, but that's not my issue.

Anything else you --

MR. LEVINE: Would that take the issue out of the hearing?

THE COURT: If you stipulated to one of the factors, I would imagine. You could stipulate to any of the factors. I don't remember what they all are, but I think there was one -- at one of our first meetings, there was talk that you might stipulate to one of the factors. Maybe it was the compactness.

MR. LEVINE: Right. The first of the Gingles preconditions, sure, right.

THE COURT: I mean, it's a PI hearing, so -- there is case law to the effect that when you have a jury trial and you're asking the jury to pull the trigger on something, the defendant can't stipulate out facts that might make it morally easier for the jury to pull the trigger. So, for example -- I can't remember. The case is called Old Chief. I think it had to do with a prior conviction being some sort of element of an

offense -- I could be wrong about that -- but the defendant wanted to stipulate to it so that the jury wouldn't hear about it, and the Court said, no, the jury -- and the government wouldn't let the jury not hear about it, and the Supreme Court said, no, the government's allowed to insist that the jury hear about it because you're asking a jury to do something difficult and that has a moral dimension and they should be able to hear all the facts that relate to what they're being asked to do.

So there are some defense stipulations, at least in the jury context, that don't take the issue out of the case. A PI hearing in front of me, different, I think. If you said you were willing to stipulate to lack of responsiveness and they wanted to prove up lack of responsiveness, I might say, no, you know, you got that, but how you stipulate to it and all that --

MR. LEVINE: Well, that's important to know the Court's views on that. Right? Because how much do you really want to hear about every budget cut for the last decade? How much do you want to hear about all the reasons why a whole slew of people are unhappy with the way the school district has been run? How much does that really influence the way that you're going to decide this case?

THE COURT: How do I know until I hear all the other evidence? I don't know. But maybe you want to stipulate that, 15 years ago, the budget was X and now it's Y; 15 years ago, class size was 22 and now it's 40; 15 years ago, there were AP

classes and now there aren't; 15 years ago, there were sports and now there aren't. I don't know. I mean, that sort of thing seems like it would save a lot of --

MR. LEVINE: Right. That's kind of what I'm talking about. Right? Those are all objective facts. They're not going to be disputed. They don't need to make a showing on that. The only reason they want to make showing on it -- I'm not even sure, actually, why they want to make a showing of it other than that, you know, the parents of the public school kids would have preferred if there hadn't been budget cuts. Well, that's also hard to dispute. It's just not relevant to this analysis.

THE COURT: Yes, but there is an argument that what we have here is more than just budget cuts and we're going to save money by removing some of the bells and whistles.

You know, where I live, the bells and whistles are there's three kids who want to swim after school and we're going to pay for a bus to take them to a neighboring town where there is a pool. That's the sort of thing that gets cut when there's tax cuts. Here, we're talking about very basic educational services. That's what they're alleging. They're not talking about luxuries being cut and bells and whistles being cut. They're talking about a school district that, at least according to the State, is giving a really substandard basic education.

MR. LEVINE: Well, again, that gets to the point, then, right? Because, as you said, you can look at a budget from one year and look at a budget from the next year.

Objective facts. Right? There's less money in the budget.

There's things that are cut. Fine. Right? They can do that if they want. But the last point that you just made about the substandard education, that actually is turning this case into something else, and that's actually requiring you to decide something completely different that has nothing to do with the Voting Rights Act and is requiring you to make sort of subjective policy judgments about whether they're doing what they're supposed to do in terms of providing an education.

THE COURT: I just think that if the cuts are so deep that they affect -- effectively result in a substandard education, that is relevant to responsiveness much more so than it would be if, oh, the three kids who want to swim have to carpool now instead of taking the bus.

MR. LEVINE: So I disagree with that, actually, because it would be the reasons why the budget cuts were made, and that's the part that's hard to prove and that requires a showing from both sides that actually is going to take up a ton of time and energy and resources, because the reasons why are what's important. If the fact of the budget cuts is something that they want to put in, well, there's no dispute. The facts are the facts. The documents are the documents. But if the

underlying reasons why is something that you're going to decide, oh, they didn't have to cut the budget, but they did anyway --

THE COURT: I'm not going to revisit could they have done a different budget.

MR. LEVINE: Well, but that's what they're asking.

They want you to decide that the School Board made bad

decisions, made the wrong --

THE COURT: No. They want me to --

MR. LEVINE: -- policy decisions.

THE COURT: They want me to decide that what the School Board did showed that it didn't care about the votes of the minority members of the community. That's, I think, what they want me to decide. If the way they want to show it -- if one of the ways they want to show that is class sizes went from 20 to 40 and course offerings went from plentiful to insufficient, that seems to be a reasonable way to do it.

But what I would do if I were the plaintiffs, since these things probably, in many respects, are not disputed -- I mean, nobody's going to say -- if there used to be AP classes and now there aren't, that's a knowable fact. If that's the sort of thing you want to prove up, they used to have AP classes and now they don't; they used to have 22 kids per class and now it's 42; they used to have music and art and now they don't; they used to have full-day kindergarten and now they

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don't; they used to have sports and now they don't. Make a wish list. Maybe they'll stipulate to a lot of it because either it's true or not

MR. LEVINE: Right, but then the question is so what, right?

THE COURT: And that has to await the hearing. It may turn out that it doesn't even make it into the calculus, but I can't say now that I know for sure it doesn't.

MR. LEVINE: Well, there are certain factors that we do know for sure are going to be important. We do know for sure that they cannot win their case -- they cannot win this motion for preliminary injunction because they can't show a likelihood of success on the merits and if they don't satisfy the last two Gingles preconditions and if they don't actually meet the two most important of the Senate factors, which are to the extent to which the minority group members have been elected to office and the extent to which voting is racially polarized. We could have a preliminary injunction hearing focused on just those absolutely essential things that determine whether or not they have a likelihood of success on the merits without imposing on the parties this incredible burden to prove up the reasons behind policy decisions for the last ten years that the Board has been making, and that would be more than sufficient to resolve the motion for preliminary injunction, because if they don't have those, they lose. And

even if they do have responsiveness, it says nothing one way or another about whether they win or lose.

THE COURT: I'm all for narrowing the hearing. And if you want to agree that if they prove those two, they get their PI and if they don't, they don't, that's great. That makes life a lot easier for everybody. If you're willing to take the position that they just have to prove those two preconditions and then they get their PI, I can't imagine why I would let them put in evidence on any other issues. For purposes of the PI. Obviously, the case goes on.

MR. LEVINE: That's not a position I'm taking. I mean, the Gingles Court says, it says that these two factors, the extent to which minority group members have been elected to office and the extent to which voting is racially polarized, those are the factors. All of the other factors are just supportive, right?

THE COURT: Okay, but I'm going to let them support, if they can. I can't say to them, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, that you can't prove up what the Supreme Court says is relevant.

MR. LEVINE: But wouldn't it make sense on a preliminary record for a preliminary injunction to limit it to just the things that they absolutely have to prove to win? And if it turns out they need to prove other stuff to get over the hump, well, that's what litigation is about. We can do regular

discovery according to an ordinary schedule and they can prove it up.

THE COURT: If you're okay with they just have to prove those preconditions and, therefore, they win and the other things we've been talking about aren't relevant to those preconditions, then -- I mean, you guys should have a conversation. Maybe we can narrow it.

Look, we've got a two-week hearing, so that's going to narrow what people can do. And I think the parties should negotiate on how much time each side is going to use of that two weeks. We're not going to try the whole case and we're not going to try the history of everything that's ever happened in the East Ramapo School District. Obviously, there are limits, because there are limits to what discovery you can get done between now and April 12th.

MR. LEVINE: Right. That's exactly why we brought this motion, your Honor. That's exactly what we're trying to accomplish with this, because, right now, the discovery that they're seeking and the case that they want to make absolutely goes to the entire history of everything that's ever happened in the school district.

THE COURT: Well, that's why you'll have Judge

McCarthy to draw some lines, but the one line that's not going

to be drawn is this stuff is irrelevant. It's not irrelevant.

You might be able to make it irrelevant through an agreement.

God bless. I would be all for that. But the fact that they might be able to prove their case without this or, even with this, they might not, doesn't make it irrelevant. I can't tell that yet. I can't tell whether this is going to help them make their case or whether they could make their case without it. So it seems relevant to me.

You might want to -- you've made two -- I don't know if you intended it as a suggestion or an offer, but you made two what I think are very practical propositions. One is stipulating to the facts that the plaintiffs want to prove up under the responsiveness rubric, or at least a bunch of them, or stipulating that all they have to prove is A and B and then they win. Now, I don't know if all they have to -- or, actually, maybe it's B and C of the three main factors. But I don't know that the latter stipulation would make this sort of evidence irrelevant or not. That's between you guys.

MR. LEVINE: Well, now, just suppose, hypothetically, plaintiffs are not willing to do that and plaintiffs are not willing to agree to anything that prevents them from showing all of the things they want to show about how bad the school district is and how much they disagree with all of these decisions that were made and how they think they were immoral, because that's what this case is really about. It's got nothing to do with elections or voting, and, unfortunately, we're not able to get there.

THE COURT: They're not going to win if they don't prove up what the Supreme Court says they have to prove up about elections and voting.

And if you guys can't agree, I'm going to come up with a number. I'm going to say you have -- totally making this up -- 25 hours. What they do with it is their problem and what you do with yours is yours. As I said, totally making those numbers up. So you guys should add that issue to your long list of things you're negotiating or fighting about.

And both sides are going to have to make decisions about what evidence they think is most important, but I think some reasonable targeted stipulations could save both sides a lot of heartburn, because if a stipulation saves them from having to prove something up and it saves you from having to produce discovery, seems like it's all good. Or at least for now. If you can't get to yes, fine. Everybody will just prove their case the old-fashioned way.

So I leave you to the capable hands of Magistrate McCarthy.

Anything else we should do this morning?
All right. See you soon.

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